February 28, 2024, Minnesota Supreme Court Caselaw Update

This week, the Minnesota Supreme Court released opinions in two criminal cases and granted review of one criminal case.

First, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed three first-degree murder convictions from Carlton County in State v. Thompson, A22-1277, (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024).  The supreme court determined that any misconduct committed by the prosecutor during closing argument—improper speculation—did not have a significant effect on the jury’s verdicts because Thompson confessed to the murders, his confession was corroborated by independent evidence, the jury was repeatedly instructed that it should disregard the statements of counsel if the statements differed from the juror’s recollection of the evidence, and defense counsel had an opportunity to rebut the speculative statements during closing argument.

OPA221277-022824.pdf (mncourts.gov)

Second, in In re Welfare of D.J.F.-D., A22-0654, (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024), the supreme court interpreted Rule 20.01, subdivision 7(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure—the competency rule—and concluded that “[s]o long as the juvenile court continues to make findings of incompetency, the State may file attendant, timely notices of intention to prosecute, thereby extending the suspension of delinquency proceedings until the child ages out of juvenile jurisdiction.”  What this means is that, if a child is found incompetent to proceed, the State can file a notice of intention to prosecute the child every year until the juvenile becomes an adult.  In other words, the State is not limited to only filing one notice of intention to prosecute a child.

OPA220654-022824.pdf (mncourts.gov)

The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review in State v. Balsley, A23-0133 (Minn. App. Dec. 4, 2023) to interpret the engrained offender sentencing statute—Minnesota Statutes section 609.3455, subdivision 3a(a)(2).  

The specific issue presented is whether a 2017 conviction for assault in the second degree qualifies as a “previously committed” predatory crime for the purposes of enhancing a sentence under the engrained-offender statute, when the conviction was out of sequence from the current conviction—a delayed report case where the charged offense allegedly occurred in 2015?